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1 Although referring to pragmatism has become a common practice in the social sciences
over the last ten years, it has developed somewhat confusingly. One of the reasons for
this state of affairs is that, rather than being a clearly defined doctrine the principles of
which one might adhere to, pragmatism is first and foremost an attitude and a method. On
the one hand, pragmatism refers to a typical American predilection for adventure and the
discovery of uncharted territories, a particular fondness for risk-taking, an awareness of
the  sway  of  contingency  and  uncertainty  in  individual  endeavour  (Wahl  2005).  The
pragmatist attitude invites one to acknowledge the infinite openness of the world we live
in  and the  fact  that  human beings  are  integral  parts  of  their  physical  and material
environment. It commands to be mindful of the “creativity of action” (Joas 1997). In the
social sciences,  this attitude translates into the priority of action over thought and a
specific sensitivity to the incapacitated state in which science finds itself when it tries to
explain what occurs when people act together (Toulmin 1984).
2 On the other hand, pragmatism is
[…] a method for the practical evaluation of ideas, concepts, and philosophies, not
from the point of view of their internal coherence or rationality, but from the point
of view of their “practical  consequences” [...]  Pragmatism offers an answer to a
question: how to forge ideas for acting and thinking. (Lapoujade 1997: 10)
3 Pinkard (2007) has singled out two determining aspects of this method. The first is that
knowledge should be conceived of as an aspect of the evolutionary process whereby life
(and the human species) subsists and grows. The second concerns normativity. From a
pragmatist perspective, individuals select the norms to which they confer authority and
decide to abide by or not (which means that individuals are capable of subjecting norms
to criticism) in view of the satisfaction of their practical needs.1 
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4 The spirit of this brand of philosophy is conveyed by both this attitude and this method.
One of the problems the reception of Pragmatism in the social sciences is confronted with
is that one tends to confuse its spirit with its letter – that is a reputed finite corpus of
theoretical  propositions.  This  confusion  is  all  the  more  complicated  than  the  label
pragmatism in its academic uses accommodates at least five different strands of thought:
1. First the original – and already deeply divided – pragmatism of the four founding fathers:
Peirce  (philosophy  of  logic  and  mathematics  and  theory  of  signs);  James  (radical
empiricism); Dewey (theory of inquiry and experience), and Mead (social behaviourism).
2. “Analytical pragmatism,” formulated in connection with Vienna Circle’s logical empiricists
(especially Carnap). 
3. “Democratic pragmatism,” which appeared when C. W. Mills, following Dewey, endorsed the
social critique developed by the Frankfurt School proponents who emigrated to the US in
the 1940’s (Adorno, Horkheimer, Neuman, Marcuse) (Horowitz 1966).
4. In the mid 1970s, Apel’s interpretation of Peirce and Mead alongside Habermas’ theory of
communicative action gave birth to an intersubjective version of pragmatics that, strangely
enough, became annexed to Pragmatism (Kreplak and Lavergne 2008).
5. Eventually,  a  revival  of  Pragmatism occurred under the lead of  contemporary American
philosophers (Putnam, Rorty, Brandom) who have rediscovered its foundational legacy on
the two opposing sides of community and democracy.
5 Thus, looking for a canonical definition of the letter of pragmatism and striving to adhere
to it seems to be a misleading undertaking. The best contemporary sociologists should do,
I would argue, is retrieving a series of basic methodological orientations by browsing
through the pragmatist literature and ascertaining how they might eventually be made
use of by the social sciences. Bernstein has mapped out a path to proceed:
For all their differences, there are common themes running through the works of
the “classical” pragmatists. There is a persistent questioning of the very idea that
philosophy (or any form of inquiry) rests upon secure, fixed foundations which can
be  known  with  certainty.  More  radically,  the  pragmatists  challenge  the  tacit
presupposition of much modern philosophy that the rationality and legitimacy of
knowledge require necessary foundations. Inquiry neither has or needs any such
foundations. The pragmatists did not think that abandoning all foundational claims
and metaphors leads to skepticism (or relativism). They stressed the fallibility of all
inquiry. Every knowledge claim is open to potential criticism. It is precisely because
of this intrinsic fallibility that, beginning with Peirce, the pragmatists focused their
attention on the community of inquirers to test and criticize all validity claims […]
The classical pragmatists shared a cosmological vision of an open universe in which
there is irreducible novelty, chance, and contingency. They rejected doctrines of
mechanical  determinism which were so popular  in  the late  nineteenth century.
(Bernstein 1992 : 814-5)
6 Following this lead, this article aims at demonstrating that, rather than its letter, it is the
spirit  of  pragmatism  which  justifies  claiming  its  affinity  with  analytical  philosophy,
realist  interactionism  and  ethnomethodology.  To  do  so,  I  will  rely  on  Putnam’s
qualification of this spirit, which he has defined by four main features: a) antiskepticism,
that is, doubt must be seen as the origin of knowledge and as a positive factor since it
elicits inquiry; b) fallibilism, that is no metaphysical guarantee exists which immunizes
any belief against revision; c) a rejection of the fact/value dichotomy (objective facts
cannot  be  thought  of  as  totally  separated from the value  which people  immediately
attribute to them); and d) the primacy of practice over theory (action is the irremediable
setting in which ordinary lives unfold) (Putnam 1994: 152). According to Putnam, the key
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idea Pragmatism has brought to theoretical reasoning – philosophical or social – is that
fallibilism does  not  necessarily  lead  to  skepticism –  or  that  doubt  does  not  compel
renouncing  the  quest  for  what  he  calls  “warranted  assertability”  or  denying  the
possibility of  a valid description of  reality.  Bouveresse has given,  unwillingly,  a good
illustration of the use the social sciences might make of the blending of fallibilism and
antiskepticism. “What we should try to understand is precisely how the use of language
can  be,  in  certain  respects,  so  systematic  and  expected  and  at  the  same  time,  in  a
different way, so unpredictable and innovative” (Bouveresse 1987: 14). The same idea has
been adopted by some sociologists who analyse action in common by taking into account
the fact that social behaviour is by and large foreseeable (our expectations and the systems
of action in which they make sense are well-known to us) and, at the same time, absolutely
unpredictable (no one knows what might happen in the course of an interaction). In a
certain way, the method of Pragmatism as defined by Putnam enables the social sciences
to serenely accept that as ordinary people regularly “do things together”2 they are able to
adequately deal  with two principles  which seem to be contradictory,  that  is,  a priori
determination (they  have  a  view of  what  can be  expected  from others  in  a  host  of
situations),  and  its  opposite  (the  versatility  of  their  partners’  reactions  in  changing
circumstances).
7 Nowadays, social science scholars are prone to admit the notions of uncertainty, plurality
of worlds, and meaning-dependence on context. Many carry out their analyses from the
dynamic and open perspective which derives from these principles. They are attentive to
the changing details of the circumstances in which practical activities unfold, wary to
deny too rigid a separation between knowledge and action, and prone to seriously take
into account the forms of reasoning which organize and guide individual action. Such an
analytical stance can be viewed as part of the legacy of pragmatism to the social sciences.
Yet  the  nature  of  this  legacy  is  still  disputed  and can  be  traced  in  many  different
directions. In this article, I will discuss the nature and relevance of some presumptive
sociological heirs of pragmatism.
 
Pragmatism in a Causalist Perspective
8 In From Habits to Social Structures, Gronow (2011) presents an impressive overview of the
spectrum of uses sociology may make of pragmatism. According to him, this spectrum
ranges  from  interactionism  (which  seems  obvious  when  one  remembers  that  two
founders of pragmatism, Dewey and Mead, taught at Chicago and exert influence on the
younger generation of sociologists in the 1930s),  to structural-functionalism (which is
even more surprising when one thinks of Peirce’s and Dewey’s intractable criticism of
positivism),  including rational actor theory,  Tilly’s political  sociology,  Sen’s capability
approach, and Bourdieu’s theory of habitus. Such a list makes one a little dizzy. How
could the same approach be taken seriously that itself accommodates approaches which
have such conflicting aims and ambitions ?
9 If Gronow does not reckon that the scope of this spectrum is problematic, it is because he
maintains a reductive vision of the relationship between pragmatism and sociology. For
him, it boils down to a theory of action built entirely upon the concept of habit, which he
conceives of in a very peculiar light: 
Habitual action is  the major explanation for the emergence of social  structures.
Action  produces  structures  and  their  reproduction  takes  place  when  action  is
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habitualized, that is when we develop the dispositions to act in a certain manner in
familiar environments. (Gronow 2011: 10)
10 Gronow’s  position  is  only  partially  valid.  Whilst  habit  is  an  important  notion  in
pragmatism, it does not refer to the current definition which portrays it as a mechanical
or routine reaction brought forth by training, inculcation or embodiment. For Dewey and
Mead, an habit is a belief that has been fixed in a process of problem-solving on the basis
of which an individual is ready to act. But what is puzzling in this conception is that belief
does  not  operate  as  a  determinated  and  internalized “representation.”  According  to
pragmatism, an habit remains identical over time only if it informs a new train of action
in a satisfactory way. But if this is not the case, a new habit is substituted for the old one
as the former better meets the practical circumstances in which one needs to act. Thus
pragmatism advocates a dialectical conception of habit, static, and dynamic at the same
time.  It  is  an operating rule which is  constantly put to the test of  experience,  not a
provision stored in memory which systematically triggers a cognitive mechanism which
always elicits a pre-set reaction to a given stimulus.
11 Gronow ignores this dialectical conception of habit. On the contrary, he holds that in the
pragmatist framework habit is a crucial concept which allows for the development of 
[…] a naturalist action-centered theory of social structures – a theory which does
not  downplay  the  role  of  reflexivity  but  allocates  it  to  a  phase  of  the  action
processes  […]  Conceptually  one  can  say  that  habits  mediate action  and  social
structures. (Gronow 2011: 131)
12 Gronow seems to be unaware of his spurious interpretation of the pragmatist perspective.
His ensuing propositions are based upon Turner’s and Gross’ slants on habit. From Turner
(1994), he retains a definition of habit as “mental trace” imprinted in the neural circuits
of  an individual’s  brain which chemically achieve mediation between individuals  and
social  structures.  From Gross (2009),  he takes the view that sociology must renounce
producing a general theory of action, but rather aim, as Merton has recommended, at
developing middle-range theories. In an article which has become a point of reference in
the field, Gross has developed what he calls a “pragmatist theory of social mechanisms”
enabling him to offer an accurate explanation of  the processes through which social
order is produced and preserved. According to him, a social mechanism is “a more or less
general  sequence  or  set  of  social  events  or  processes  analysed  at  a  lower  order  of
complexity or aggregation by which – in certain circumstances – some cause X tends to
bring about some effect Y in the realm of human social  relations” (Gross 2009:  364).
Hence, he holds that pragmatism would help sociologist devising a complete account of
action since he apprehends it 
[…] as a response to problem situations [which] involves an alternation between
habit and creativity. The main way humans solve problems […] is by enacting habits
– those learned through social experience or from previous individual efforts at
problem solving. (Gross 2009: 366)
13 And Gross goes on to state that 
[…] all habits are thus enacted on the basis of culturally mediated interpretations of
the situation one faces, not least interpretations of the intentions of interaction
partners. (Gross 2009: 367)
14 These  are  two substantial  deviations  from a  pragmatist  approach which  presumably
enable Gross to recommend endorsing it.  According to him, five reasons may compel
sociologists  to  adhere  to  the  pragmatist  conception of  action:  1)  it  does  not  equate
problem-solving with the maximization of utility; 2) it insists that problematic situations
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are always interpreted through cultural lenses; 3) it argues that much action is habitual
and typically involves no conscious weighing of means and ends; 4) it maintains that
instrumental rationality itself is a kind of habit, a way in which some humans can learn to
respond to  certain situations,  and that  one should be  as  interested in  the  historical
processes by which the habit of rationality develops and is deployed as one should be in
its effects, and 5) it suggests that means and ends are not always given prior to action as
assumed in most rational choice models, but often emerge from action, as lines of activity
are initiated that lead actors to see themselves in new ways, to value different kinds of
goods,  and  to  become  attached  to  problem solutions  they  could  not  have  imagined
previously.
15 The way Gross pictures the pragmatist conception of action leads him to claim that it
warrants an objective view of the relationship between individual behaviour and social
structures (i.e. habits offer a satisfactory answer to the micro-macro link problem). He
hypothesizes that 
[…] most social mechanisms can be understood as chains or aggregations of actors,
problem situations, and habitual responses […] always with the possibility that a
novel way of responding to a problem could emerge for any of the actors involved,
potentially altering the workings of the mechanism [...] A pragmatist social science
concerned with mechanisms would aim to uncover the nature of such chains: the
types into which they of may be classified, the actors involved in their operation,
the habits employed by such actors and their origins, the circumstances in which
the mechanisms operate, their interconnection with other mechanisms, and their
causal effects. (Gross 2009: 369) 
16 Gross concludes: 
Sociology should aim to identify the main social mechanisms by which cause and
effect relationships in the social world that are of moral, political, or intellectual
importance come about. This entails breaking complex social phenomena into their
component parts to see how aggregations or chains of actors employing habits to
resolve problem situations bring about systematic effects. (Gross 2009: 375)
17 Gross’s  pragmatist  theory  of  social  mechanisms  appears  to  contradict  the  spirit  of
pragmatism, or at least one of its most important pillars : fallibilism, i.e. the essential
incompleteness of action which drives people to implement an experimental procedure
(an inquiry) in order to provide a practical solution (a determination) to the countless
“indeterminate”  situations  they  have  to  confront  in  everyday  life.  The  open  and
unpredictable nature of inquiry would lead one to admit that it denies the possibility of
giving any causal explanation of action since all  matters which are dealt with in the
course of an inquiry are doomed to change during the determination process itself __
which contradicts  the  sheer  idea  of  “mechanism.”  And this  contradiction  cannot  be
eradicated using Gronow’s statement to the effect that the phenomenon of habituality is
essential in explaining social reproduction. 
Habituality is not the only key to such explanations but it is a key nevertheless –
and one that has not been taken into account as much as it should be. Habits are
bodily and therefore it can seem that they are a purely individual phenomenon.
However,  due  to  the  intersubjective  nature  of  human  sociality,  we  almost
instinctively take the habitual attitudes of others into account and adjust our own
action accordingly. (Gronow 2011: 131)
18 Gronow overlooks the fact that doubt and indeterminacy are two major mainstays of the
pragmatist standpoint. Accordingly, accounting for action in common should rule out any
attempt  to  explain  it  by  reducing  it  to  a  mechanism.  The  causalist,  culturalist  and
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cognitivist twists given to the notion of habit by Gross and Gronow, portraying it as a
culturally stabilized way of behaving which is stored in the brain and guides individual
action mechanically,  are  totally  at  odds  with the features  of  the pragmatist  attitude
(which favours  anti-foundationalism,  anti-theoreticism,  anti-mentalism,  pluralism and
holism), ignoring the assumptions which define its method (infinite openness of inquiry,
duality of habit, experimentalism, indeterminacy, uncertainty). Let us turn now to a more
genuine – yet challenging – use that sociology has made of the legacy of Pragmatism.
 
Goffman’s Definition of the Situation
19 When one ponders over the relation between Pragmatism and sociology, four notions
come immediately to mind:  definition of the situation;  taking the place of the other;
plurality  of  worlds,  and  the  Self.  In  Frame  Analysis Goffman  has  straightforwardly
dispensed with some of them. Let us first consider his qualification of the first notion:
There  is  a  venerable  tradition  in  philosophy  that  argues  that  what  the  reader
assumes to be real is but a shadow […] A current example of this tradition can be
found in the W. I. Thomas dictum: “If men define situations as real, they are real in
their  consequences.”  This  statement  is  true  as  it  reads  but  false  as  it  is  taken.
Defining situations as real certainly has consequences, but these may contribute
very  marginally  to  the  events  in  progress,  in  some  cases only  a  slight
embarrassment flits across the scene in mild concern for those who tried to define
the  situation  wrongly  […]  Presumably,  a  “definition  of  the  situation”  is  almost
always to be found, but those who are in the situation ordinarily do not create this
definition, even though their society often can be said to do so; ordinarily, all they
do is  to  assess  correctly  what  the  situation ought  to  be  for  them and then act
accordingly. (Goffman 1974: 1-2)
20 Contrary to Dewey’s view, Goffman conceives then of a situation as a “membrane”3 which
cuts off a fragment from the social world and operates as a filter that selects among the
many obligations members of a society have to comply with those which have a specific
relevance  to  the  here  and  now  of  an  ongoing  action  in  common  (Ogien  1999).
Furthermore,  his  conception  is  connected  to  a  pluralist  outlook  on society.  He thus
contends that: 
one  finds,  in  modern  societies  at  least,  (is)  a  nonexclusive  linkage  –  a  “loose
coupling” – between interactional practices and social structures, a collapsing of
strata  and  structures  into  broader  categories,  the  categories  themselves  not
corresponding one-to-one to anything in the structural world, a gearing as it were
of various structures into interactional cogs. Or, if you will, a set of transformation
rules, or a membrane selecting how various externally relevant social distinctions
will be managed within the interaction. (Goffman 1983a: 11)
21 For Goffman, the strength of this loose coupling is constantly put to a test within the
ceaseless  flow of  action  in  common in  everyday  life.  Goffman is  then  led  to  endow
individuals with an epistemic capacity to make an operative use of two kinds of frames:
primary and secondary. Primary frames turn
[…] what would otherwise be a meaningless aspect of the scene into something that
is  meaningful  […]  each  primary  framework  allows  its  user  to  locate,  perceive,
identify, and label a seemingly infinite number of concrete occurrences defined in
its terms. He is likely to be unaware of such organized features as the framework
has and unable to describe the framework with any completeness if asked, yet these
handicaps are no bar to his easily and fully applying it. (Goffman 1974: 21)
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22 Once primary frames have been projected (an “operating fiction temporarily accepted”
says Goffman), “transformations” come into play to monitor the necessary adjustments to
constant changes in interaction. Goffman asserts that:
[…] in many cases, the individual in our society is effective in his use of particular
frameworks. The elements and processes he assumes in his reading of the activity
often are ones that the activity itself manifests – and why not, since social life itself
is often organized as something that individuals will be able to understand and deal
with. A correspondence or isomorphism is thus claimed between perception and
the organization of what is perceived, in spite of the fact that there are likely to be
many  valid  principles  of  organization  that  could  but  don’t  inform  perception.
(Goffman 1974: 26)
23 Such  permanent  ordering  and  reordering  of  social  reality  during  interaction  occurs
according  to  the  multiple  and  unpredictable  ways  individuals  are  able  to  associate
primary and secondary frameworks. These frameworks afford impersonal (they apply to
all)  and  binding  (their  use  is  compelling,  as  far  as  one  wants  to  make  one’s  action
intelligible to others) criteria of judgement that all those who are engaged in a situation
should  employ.  This  phenomenon  is  empirically  substantiated  and  it  is  seen  as
demonstrating that everyone manages to adequately make use of these criteria since they
are  incorporated into  ordinary  language  and inhere  in  each of  the  normative  order
appropriate to practical activities. Hence Goffman surmises that: 
[…]  whenever  we  come  into  contact  with  another  through  the  mails,  over  the
telephone,  in  face-to-face  talk,  or  even  under  merely  through  immediate  co-
presence, we find ourselves with one central obligation : to render our behaviour
understandably  relevant  to  what  the  other  can  come  to  perceive  is  going  on.
Whatever else, our activity must be addressed to the other’s mind, that is, to the
other’s capacity  to  read  our  words  and  actions  for  evidence  of  our  feelings,
thoughts and intent. This confines what we say and do, but it also allows us to bring
to bear all of the world to which the other can catch allusions. (Goffman 1983b: 51)
24 Goffman  denies  that  a  mutual  agreement  reached  through  rational  deliberation  is
required for action to take place in a smooth and coordinated way since, generally, the
appearance of coordination is enough for people to guess that it is actually working. That
is  why  he  claims  that  defining  a  situation  must  be  conceived  of  as  a  never-ending
endeavour which requires uninterrupted involvement by all parties in an interaction:
[…] the process of mutually sustaining a definition of the situation in face-to-face
interaction is socially organized through rules of relevance and irrelevance. These
rules for the management of engrossment appear to be an insubstantial element of
social life, a matter of courtesy, manners, and etiquette. But it is to these flimsy
rules, and not to the unshaking character of the external world that we owe our
unshaking sense of realities. (Goffman 1961: 81)
25 Goffman has later revised his too optimistic statement about our “unshaking sense of
realities”  insisting  next  on  the  vulnerability  of  social  reality  –  a  vulnerability  that
unavoidably affects even the natural or corporeal features of human life.
By definition, we can participate in social situations only if we bring our bodies and
their accoutrements along with us, and this equipment is vulnerable by virtue of
the  instrumentalities  that  others  bring  along  with  their  bodies.  We  become
vulnerable  to  physical  assault,  sexual  molestation,  kidnapping,  robbery  and
obstruction of movement, whether through the unnegotiated application of force
or, more commonly, “coercive exchange” […] Similarly, in the presence of others
we become vulnerable through their words and gesticulation to the penetration of
our psychic preserves, and to the breaching of the expressive order we expect will
be maintained in our presence. (Goffman 1983a: 4)
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26 To sum up, Goffman substitutes the view that social reality is irremediably submitted to
vulnerability for a construal of the notion of definition of the situation which
acknowledges that acting together requires reaching an explicit agreement on what is
going on. He therefore recommends that sociological attention be directed 
[…] on what it is about our sense of what is going on that makes it so vulnerable to
the need for these various re-readings [...]  I  am not addressing the structure of
social life but the structure of experience individuals have at any moment of their
social lives. (Goffman 1983a: 13)
27 The  second mainstay  of  pragmatism that  Goffman objects  to  is  Mead’s  foundational
notion of “conversation of gestures” (Mead 1922) which, according to him, begs the social
nature  of  “naturalness.”  Considering the  bearing  of  the  mere  presence  of  bodies  on
interaction, he contends that :
Mead’s  distinction  between  “significant”  and  “nonsignificant”  gestures  is  not
entirely  satisfactory  here.  Body  idioms  involve  something  more  than  a
nonsignificant “conversation of gestures” because this idiom tends to evoke the
same meaning for the actor as for the witness, and tends to be employed by the
actor  because  of  its  meaning  for  the  witness.  Something  less  than  significant
symbolism seems to be involved, however:  an extended exchange of meaningful
acts  is  not  characteristic;  an  impression  must  be  maintained  that  a  margin  of
uncalculating spontaneous involvement has been retained in the act; the actor will
usually  be  in  a  position  to  deny the  meaning of  his act  if  he  is  challenged for
performing it. (Goffman 1963: 34, note 2)
28 In a certain way, one could argue that Goffman is more committed to the pragmatist
notions of doubt and indeterminacy than Mead. Whereas the latter asserts that an act can
be complete whenever the appropriate response of the other has been picked out among
those which the environment makes available, the former suspects that individuals may
at  all  times  wonder  whether  the  given  response  is  satisfying or  not.  For  Goffman,
uncertainty  always  prevails  and  has  constantly  to  be  done  away  with.  To  do  so,
individuals rely first on the situation in which they find themselves. According to his
definition,  a  situation is  a  typical  and stabilized fragment  of  the  social  world which
controls beforehand individual action that comes to be engaged in it at any given point in
time. As situations pre-exist encounters and survive their termination, they operate as an
institution which provides  individuals  with  impersonal  criteria  to  ascertain  “what  is
going on” and “what to do next” in current interactions. In Goffman’s words, situations
socially organize experience, i.e. the immediate apprehension of social reality.
29 What of the notion of taking the place of the other that pragmatism has bequeathed to
sociology? The notion derives from Mead’s naturalistic account of the primitive order
commanding the exchanges between “organisms” (among them human beings) which are
set up to react in an adjusted way. Contrary to the use Blumer has made of Mead’s notion
of “conversation of gestures” by emphasizing the interpretative process involved in social
intercourse and overvaluing the notion of  Self,  Goffman focuses upon the situational
rather than the “symbolic” nature of interaction (Denzin, Keller 1981). He states:
I  assume  that  when  individuals  attend  to  any  current  situation,  they  face  the
question: “What is it that’s going on here?” Whether asked explicitly, as in times of
confusion and doubt, or tacitly, during occasions of usual certitude, the question is
put and the answer to it is presumed by the way the individuals then proceed to get
on with the affairs at hand. (Goffman 1974: 8)
30 The difference between Mead and Goffman in this regard is easy to explain. Goffman
replaces the notion of “the place of the other” with that of “role.” Whereas the former is
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socially undifferentiated, the latter refers to a socially defined position in an organized
form  of  practical  activity.  Accordingly,  people  are  currently  able  to  endorse  the
perspective  of  their  partners  in  interaction  (i.e.  the  role  they  have  to  fullfill)  while
“taking the place of the other” only requires opting for the right response. What is crucial
here is the importance both Mead and Goffman attribute to the Second Person as key
condition  for  coordination  of  action  (in  Goffman’s  perspective),  or  for  an  act  to  be
complete (in Mead’s perspective). Also of note is that behind Goffman’s role theory lies a
sociological model of practice which denies, just as Dewey did in The Quest for Certainty
(1984),  any  separation  between  knowledge  and  action.  This  model  combines  three
features:
1. everyone has prior knowledge of the approximate practical  meaning attached to objects
that populate the environment and to unpredictable events that arise in a situation;
2. everyone presumably assumes that such a knowledge is also the one their partners in an
interaction possess; and consequently;
3. everyone aligns their action on the particular normative order which allegedly sets what
kind of judgements the others might elicit according to the situation they find themselves
in.
31 This model is based upon the assumption that each situation specifies a series of “role
obligations” (Hardimon 1994), i.e. expectations that one had better to abide by in a given
interaction provided that others exert immediate control over the way one plays the role
one  is  supposed  to  perform.  The  model  extends  to  all  social  life.  Since  individuals
experience many situations and endorse a multitude of different roles, one can assume
that they share, even if approximately, a common knowledge about a huge array of such
role obligations and get a satisfactory enough sense of the correctness of the “moves”
they can make in each situation they are engaged in. This leads to the third sociological
amendment to Pragmatism.
 
The Plurality of Normative Orders
32 A crucial aspect of the spirit of Pragmatism is pluralism. The question then turns out to
be pluralism of what? Presenting pragmatism as a form of meliorism, Talisse and Aikin
have introduced a distinction between: 
[…] two general styles of pursuing this meliorist aim. According to what we called
inquiry pragmatism, conflicts are to be resolved by the thoroughgoing application
of proper methods of inquiry;  this would require not only processes of ongoing
experimentation but also efforts to maintain the conditions under which inquiry
could continue. According to what we called meaning pragmatism, conflicts are to
be dissolved by a pragmatic reconstruction of the terms in which the conflict is
cast; this means that, when confronted with apparently interminable disputes, we
ought to revise our vocabularies in ways that, as William James advised, “bring in
peace.” (Talisse & Akin 2005: 145) 
33 Accordingly, Talisse and Aikin claim that pragmatist pluralism amounts to 
[…] a principled commitment to admirable habits of openness, inclusion, tolerance,
anti-hegemony,  and  experimentalism  in  all  aspects  of  moral,  political,  and
intellectual life. (Talisse & Aikin 2005: 145)
34 They decry the irresoluteness of such a principled commitment as it fails to engage the
so-called modus vivendi version of pluralism – i.e. the relativist stance according to which
any justification of an action can be taken as valid. Mysak (2005) has elaborated upon
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Talisse and Aikin’s distinction on more conceptual grounds. According to her, whereas
meaning pluralism has to do with the notion of truth (as personified by Peirce), inquiry
pluralism is just a matter of standpoints adopted to solve ethical conflicts (as personified
by James, Dewey, and Rorty). Mysak’s differentiation aptly disentangles two strands of
pluralism : moral and methodological. The latter is what sociology is concerned with.4
35 Goffman, Durkheim, and Garfinkel have devised a sociological version of pluralism which
acknowledges the existence of a plurality of normative orders – meaning that individuals
regularly make use of as many situated normative orders as needed to sequentially adjust
their involvement in the situated action in which they take part (Ogien 2013a). From the
perspective of what Mysak calls “inquiry pragmatism,” pluralism concerns the relation to
truth.  Sociologists  would  rather  admit  that  it  has  to  do  with  normativity  and  the
regulatory function it fulfils in coordination of action in common. To get the difference,
let us consider first the way Goffman disallows James’ view on pluralism:
I try to follow a tradition established by William James in his famous chapter “The
Perception of  Reality,”  first  published as  an  article  in Mind in  1869.  Instead of
asking  what  reality  is,  he  gave  matters  a  subversive  phenomenological twist,
italicizing the following question: Under what circumstances do we think things are
real? The important thing about reality, he implied, is our sense of its realness in
contrast to our feeling that some things lack this quality. In his answer, James […]
made a stab at differentiating the several different worlds that our attention and
interest can make real for us, the possible subuniverses, the “orders of existence”
(to use Aron Gurwitsch’s phrase), in each of which an object or a given kind can
have its proper being: the world of the senses, the world of scientific objects, the
world of abstract philosophical truths, the world of myth and supernatural beliefs,
the madman’s world, etc. Each of these subworlds, according to James, has “its own
special and separate style of existence” and “each world, whilst it is attended to, is
real after its own fashion; only the reality lapses with the attention.” Then after
taking this radical stand, James copped out: he allowed that the world of the senses
has a special status, being the one we judge to be the realest reality, the one that
retains our liveliest belief, the one before which the other worlds must give way […]
James’ crucial device, of course, was a rather scandalous play on the word “world”
(or reality).  What he meant was not the world but a particular person’s current
world – and in fact as will be argued not even that. There was no good reason to use
such billowy words. James opened a door; it let in wind as well as light. (Goffman
1974: 99)
36 Goffman, Schütz and Garfinkel acknowledge that all the “provinces of meaning” are on a
par. The sociological approach to pluralism they advocate rests upon two facts. First, the
world in which we live is fragmented and each organized practical activity is a social
world in itself. Second, people know how to shift from one social world to another in their
everyday life involvements without any major problem. Sociologists have focused upon
this capacity to permanently adjust to the changing circumstances of situated action in
common and demonstrated that individuals master a multitude of normative orders since
observation shows that they regularly succeed in acting appropriately in most of their
commitments.  Some pragmatists  share the same concern when they employ Dewey’s
notion of “valuation” (Dewey 1939) to account for the fact that people discover what they
care about in the course of achieving the “ends-in-view” they collectively aim at in a
given context of action (Frega 2014). 
37 Endorsing the perspective of normative pluralism has led sociologists and pragmatists to
share the view that individuals may select the norms and values which they provisionally
take to be valuable and decide to abide by or not according to whether their decisions are
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satisfactory  in  relation  to  the  unfolding  circumstances  of  action.  Sociologist  and
pragmatists  both agree to confer two features upon norms.  First,  they are known to
individuals, i.e. they do not operate as purely external constraints as traditional sociology
pretends they do, so that individuals may reckon that acting as supposedly expected by
others allows their behaviour to be seen as acceptable. Second, they supply a host of
ready-made justifications to explain what is happening here and now and what exactly
people are doing. In a certain way then, one could claim that the pluralist conception of
normative orders offers a sociological version of one of the provisions of pragmatism that
Putnam advanced, that is the collapse of the fact/value dichotomy.
 
Garfinkel’s Debunking of the Self
38 Another  element  that  pragmatism has  bequeathed to  sociology is  the  notion of  self.
Everyone would agree that this is part of Mead’s legacy which has flourished thanks to
Blumer. For many sociologists, the introduction of this notion favours a subjectivist bent
in the discipline. This is precisely the heart of Garfinkel’s rebuttal of Mead’s work (Ogien
2013b). 
39 According to Garfinkel,  since Mead supports an essentialist conception of the self,  he
presents the identity of persons in terms of constancy. Garfinkel asserts that constancy
can be conferred upon a person neither theoretically nor conceptually. He claims that it
must be viewed as a “practical accomplishment.” From his point of view, “having an
identity”  must  be  conceived  of  as  an  activity  requiring,  as  any  activity,  the
implementation of categorization procedures resulting in the ascription of the “same”
identity to someone no matter the changes one may happen to experience over time.
Garfinkel also objects to Mead’s conception of the “social act” according to which the
anticipation of the aim of an action is already part of its inception.5 In this perspective,
what happens in an action in common seems to be already fixed in the propensities of the
act itself.  Such a view amounts to ignoring the unpredictable result of the sequential
unfolding of situated interactions – which seems unacceptable even from a pragmatist
perspective (Mead 1932).  For Garfinkel,  action in common can only be accounted for
through a detailed analysis of the way it sequentially unfolds in the inner movement of its
accomplishment – in other words, its “reflexivity” (in the ethnomethodological sense of
the notion).6 An important feature of this conception of reflexivity is that it radically
proscribes  any  possibility  of  deciding  the  end  of  an  action  in  advance,  since  each
temporal  sequence  constitutes  itself  in  the  course  of  its  fulfilment  and  defines  the
conditions of intelligibility of succeeding sequences. 
40 Garfinkel’s third criticism tackles the notion of “taking the role of the other.” He claims
that Mead admits that the notion of “role” refers to a set of “attitudes” that are part of
the cognitive equipment of a “subject” able to instantly and adequately endorse them in
order to behave appropriately in ordinary social relationships. Thereby he argues that
Mead’s pragmatist approach is mentalistic through and through.
41 Garfinkel’s objections are notably misguided since any attentive reader would reckon
that,  far from championing an essentialist,  subjectivist,  individualistic,  mentalistic,  or
psychological outlook, Mead argues that the Self must be regarded as the product of a
ceaseless interplay between object and subject, not as a conscience, and even less as an
identity, or as the true and only originator of individual action. Yet Garfinkel’s judgment
on  Mead  cannot  be  reduced  to  a  downright  dismissal.  He  holds  that  Mead’s  The
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Philosophy of the Present is a book that any sociologist should have read (Garfinkel 2002)
and eventually acknowledges the affinity of his sociological approach with the pragmatist
outlook as both share three analytical principles : the absolute primacy given to practice;
the sequential and reflexive nature of temporality; the existence of an internal relation
between objects and resources. 
 
Convergence
42 The  propositions  that  exemplify  the  spirit  of  pragmatism  are  theoretical  constructs
which generally lack empirical verification. Emirbayer and Maynard (2011) have argued
that three basic elements of the pragmatist outlook have been empirically substantiated
by a series of studies in ethnomethodology: 1) the necessity to get back to the practices
themselves to account for what the experience of the social world is made of; 2) the idea
that problematic situations compel people to engage in a practical activity aiming at their
resolution and prompting the constitution of a collective intelligence which allow for
their resolution; 3) the conception of language use as an order of practices by which the
naturalness of social life is accomplished. That is why, Emirbayer and Maynard contend,
the sequential  analysis  of  practical  activities promoted by Garfinkel  and Sacks (1970)
shows a family resemblance with pragmatism.
43 According to Quéré and Terzi (2011), however, if Emirbayer and Maynard’s account of the
convergence of pragmatism and ethnomethodology is on the whole correct, it disregards
social phenomena the importance of which has been highlighted by pragmatism. Quéré
and Terzi argue that taking these phenomena into account would enrich the too narrow
conception of experience that ethnomethodology still retains and suggest that it should
benefit  from  taking  into  consideration  the  aesthetic  and  experimental  nature  of
experience and the role that emotion plays in capturing the sense of situations and the
orientation of action. Quéré (2012) suggests that a more pragmatist-oriented sociology
should extend its field of investigation by producing analyses in terms of the deweyean
notion  of  “transaction”  by  which  he  means  striving  to  account  for  the  fact  that
individuals,  collectives,  and institutions are entangled in a dynamic relationship with
their environment and that solving problems is invariably coloured and guided by the
emotions triggered while individuals gather to settle the situations they are confronted
to.  This  is  the  nearest  one  can  get  to  a  consistent  combination  of  pragmatism and
sociology.
 
New Rules for Sociological Practice?
44 A certain  degree  of  similitude  between pragmatism and what  I  may name “realistic
interactionism” has been evidenced by way of a comparative analysis of four notions that
belong  to  both  traditions:  definition  of  the  situation;  taking  the  place  of  the  other;
plurality of worlds, and self. The same primary concern has been pointed out in both
approaches,  that  is,  paying  attention  first  to  the  practical  dimensions  of  action  in
common, focusing upon inquiry on the one hand, and on reflexivity of action (or framing
procedures) on the other. The difference lies in the fact that this attention is more of a
theoretical endeavour in the case of pragmatism, whereas it is an empirical assignment
for  fieldwork  sociology.  The  later  is  devoted  to  producing  detailed  accounts  of  the
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sequentiality of ongoing interactions to demonstrate how step by step action in common
takes the shape it eventually displays. 
45 It has been claimed that endorsing such an analytical approach compels sociologist to
follow three methodological rules which can be traced to pragmatism: 1) never explain
what is happening by using the abstract categories of a theoretical model; 2) forget the
separation between external and internal factors, and admit that external factors always
inhere  in  the  way  people  act  together  and  do  not  determinate  it  from  outside;
3) renounce the fact/value dichotomy. 
46 For some analysts (such as Latour or Rorty), these rules justify the preference they give to
the singular over the general. This is a position which is sometimes complemented by a
petition of principle to the effect that there is no science but of the particular, that is, no
generalization is ever possible. From this controversial perspective, order always appears
to emerge from scratch – as if it were a contextual and circumstantial production created
in a social vacuum. For others, following these rules allows for the endorsing a holistic
approach according to which the ways individuals apprehend the social world, talk about
it, and act together in it are irremediably and completely informed by the innumerable
situations they are involved in and by the relationships they sustain with the relevant
others they happen to act with in everyday life circumstances. 
47 A further qualification is  needed.  Realistic interactionism is  divided into two brands.
Whereas Goffman sees the social  world as an endless succession of  contingent states
brought  about  in  a  ceaseless  stream of  experience  (hence  the  focus  he  places  upon
framing procedures), Garfinkel contends that, when acting together, individuals have to
invariably produce an acknowledged order to get along. Hence his analytical programme
consists in identifying and describing the “ordinary methods” people make use of to
constitute and maintain a mutual intelligibility which allows for the accomplishment of
coordination of action. But if we put this difference aside, we can pretend that Goffman’s
and Garfinkel’s outlooks (which somehow calls to mind the spirit of pragmatism) can be
extended to sociology at  large.  Three steps should be taken to move forward in this
direction.
48 The first  is  a  to  offer  a  methodological  critique  aiming  at  adding  to the  toolbox  of
sociological ethnography sound and appropriate techniques to analyse the data which are
usually collected in fieldwork (interviews, observations, informal conversations, records,
documents,  files,  etc.).  A  current  instruction  should  be reiterated:  always  relate  the
collected data to their proper context (indexicality) and in direct relation to the dynamics
of the action in common in wich they have been collected (reflexivity). Proceeding in this
way  should  avoid  two  pitfalls,  that  is,  endorsing  a  kind  of  hyper-constructivism,  or
stalling analysis in endless or tautological narratives about how what happened happened
in the way that it did.
49 The second consists in turning the sociologist’s conceptual apparatus into an object of
sociological  investigation  by  applying  the  notion  of  reflexivity  to  its  own  forms  of
reasoning  (Pollner  1991).  This  approach  usually  develops,  at  best,  as  a  devastating
refutation of sociology’s claims that it is a scientific discipline and, at worst, as a quite
inconsistent self-absorption of sociologists in their own work (Woolgar 1988).
50 The third way a realistic twist would upgrade sociology derives from its anti-mentalist
vein. It consists in turning the detailed description of the methods individuals necessarily
use  when they mutually  accomplish action in  common into  an analysis  of  the  ways
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practical  reason  materially  operates.  Coulter  (1989)  has  given  the  name  “epistemic
sociology” to this kind of fieldwork, assigning to it the task of analysing what he calls the
“grammars of conventional conceptualization.” Such a methodological framework leads
him to admit that 
[…] knowing what people are doing (including oneself) is knowing how to identify
what  they  are  doing  in  the  categories  of  a  natural  language,  which  requires
knowing how to use those categories in discursive contexts, which in turn includes
knowing when to utter them. (Coulter 1989: 16)
51 Another formulation of this statement can be found in Lynch’s proposal to investigate
what  he  defines  as  “the  primitive  structures  of  accountability  that  make  up  the
instructable reproducibility of social actions” (Lynch 1997: 299). The kind of fieldwork he
recommends to engage in aims at analysing what he names “epistopics,” a neologism he
has forged to account for practical activities like observing, measuring, or representing
that  are  locally  accomplished  in  the  daily  work  in  laboratories.  Lynch  claims  that
epistopics frame all  forms of  practical  reasoning,  whether in scientific  practice or in
ordinary action.
52 A first conclusion can be drawn at this point. A pragmatist-oriented sociology opens up a
new domain of empirical inquiry, that is, the ways epistemic operations are implemented
to give practical content to the concepts and principles individuals make use of in and for
action in common. Those who are ready to engage in such a domain should endorse a
postulate: the natural mastery of ordinary language endows individuals with a vernacular
language which is matched to a particular type of action, and such mastery signals an
acquaintance with acceptable ways of behaving in the circumstances of an ongoing action
in common (provided one has experienced it once). We can thus suppose that individuals
acting in common in a familiar context already know what they are supposed to do
together (even if this knowledge is incomplete or defective), how each role specifies the
expectations  one  can  have  about  the  way  others  might  behave  (even  if  these
specifications, and the role endorsed, can change during the course of interaction), and
what kind of anticipation should guide one’s action (even if this anticipation is ceaselessly
revised in the sequentiality of exchanges). 
53 On this account, one can assume that mutual intelligibility is a contextual phenomenon
that fires up (in a quasi-physical sense) in and for the accomplishment of an activity and
comes to a halt once the activity ceases. In other words, acting is not a matter of culture,
interiorization, learning, or information computing. It is a social phenomenon through
and  through.  Practical  reason  stems,  as  Durkheim claimed  a  century  ago,  from the
natural fact that individuals are bound to live and be raised in groups. Subsequently, they
can be taken to share a prior and unstated agreement about what the requirements of
coordination imply in a vast array of current circumstances of action. Here is how a
pragmatist-oriented sociology would demonstrate the irremediable social nature of the
activity of knowing, while avoiding any drift towards psychologism and mentalism. This
is a decisive contribution to a renewed sociological theory of knowledge.
54 A second conclusion can now be appended to the first.7 Endorsing the kind of social
naturalism advocated  by  Dewey and Mead would  help  relieve  sociologists  of  several
thorny explanatory tasks, such as those they embark upon when they attempt to answer
the false questions they are currently asked about the origin of society, the appropriate
rules  to  follow  to  achieve  peaceful  coexistence  in  society,  or  the  possibility  of
cooperation. All these questions might be dismissed straightaway by recalling that ways
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of  thinking  and coordination  of  collective  action  are  natural  features  of  the  human
species.
55 Subscribing to such a view would help sociologists to substantiate their claims about:
1) the absolute primacy of the collective over the individual; 2) the irremediable existence
of an order of physical and conceptual phenomena that pre-exist and will survive the
temporary engagement of humans in a form of practical activity; 3) the social nature of
mind; 4) the fact that coordination of action is to a large extent guided by the structure of
constraints immanent to practices and situations;  5) the principle according to which
explicit and publicly spelt out meaning is secondary to the emergence and continuation
of action in common.
56 I think that cogent arguments in favour of the relevance of these five propositions can be
derived from the kind of social naturalism advocated by pragmatism. And although this is
not the conclusion many sociologists have reached, I believe these arguments can still be
analytically instrumental, in particular when sociology deals with issues of knowledge
and mind.
57 One last upshot of connecting pragmatism to sociology is a renewed conception of the
background, i.e. of the grounds upon which humans rely when they engage in an action
in common. There are several ways to conceive of this background: generalized trust;
collective representations; internalized value systems; habit; common sense knowledge;
practical knowledge; forms of practical reasoning; frames; formal structures of practical
actions; certainty; direct perception. Behind each of these notions stands a way of looking
at the relationship between knowledge and action and of apprehending the nature of
action in common (should it be conceived of as pre-set or as dynamic?).
The  notion  of  inquiry  offered  by  pragmatism  belongs  to  the  second  of  these  two
perspectives.  It  focuses  upon doubt  and indeterminacy  since  it  defends  a  fallibilistic
stance. This approach raises a question: would resorting to the notion of inquiry lead to
favour  an  intersubjective  and  rationally  agreed  upon  approach  to  action,  or  should
inquiry be studied as a practical activity which unfolds within the limits if given social
frames? This question echoes a controversy between Putnam and Rorty. According to
Putnam, the gist of inquiry lies in the implementation of an experimental method by a
“community of inquirers” which finds itself able to solve problems by relying upon pre-
given shared criteria of “rational acceptability.” For Rorty (1982: 165-6), 
[…]  there  are  no constraints  on inquiry  save  conversational  ones,  no  wholesale
constraints derived from the nature of the objects, or of the mind, or of language,
but only those retail constraints provided by the remarks of our fellow-inquirers.
This  way  of  characterizing  pragmatism focuses  on  a  fundamental choice  which
confronts the reflective mind, that between accepting the contingent character of
starting-points, and attempting to evade this contingency. 
58 The social sciences are at pains to fully endorse the openness and contingency inherent in
the pragmatist  conception of  inquiry.  This is  evidenced when one considers the way
inquiry has been quickly reduced by many sociologists to its substantial  content and
viewed as analogous to a procedural investigation that aims at devising a solution to a
practical problem. Inquiry remains largely conceived of as carried out by individuals who
are endowed with qualified competences enabling them to master the proper “skills” to
discover the right answer to a technical or political issue. Such an outlook usually leads
researchers to frame their own definition of the “problematic situation” a community of
inquirers is supposed to resolve without worrying about whether they are justified to do
so or not as they are not practically engaged in what is happening. Such conception of
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inquiry is doubly reductive. First, because it generally gives precedence to the framework
__ system of norms, power relationships, individual experience, environmental pressures,
actor dispositions __ within which a given knowledge construes a problematic situation in
order to realize what is the best way to reason it out. Second, because it ignores the issue
of  emergence  and  pays  little  attention  to  the  efforts  deployed  by  a  community  of
inquirers to sequentially manage and complete their task.
59 A pragmatist-oriented sociology should consider the openness and contingency of inquiry
as topics that need to be empirically investigated since they are essential aspects of action
in common. Research in this area would aim at demonstrating how individuals acting
together mutually solve problems which their common endeavour unrelentingly raises.
Such a standpoint is pragmatist in spirit as it takes doubt to be the onset of inquiry.
Moreover, these problems should be apprehended as only provisionally solved since any
development  might  re-open  inquiry  at  any  time.  Endorsing  this  radically  fallibilist
perspective, sociologists should pay particular attention to the ingenious ways in which
three features of action in common are overcome in practical activities: indeterminacy
(descriptions  are  never  complete  and  individuals  have  constantly  to  make  sense  by
themselves  of  the  unavoidable  shortcomings  of  communication);  contextuality
(renouncing any kind of essentialism and adhering to Wittgenstein’s ordinary grammar
perspective  according  to  which  the  meaning  of  a  word  is  its  use);  and  emergence
(apprehending  action  in  common  from  the  point  of  view  of  its  reflexivity  –  in  its
ethnomethodological sense, that is holding that practical activities unfold sequentially
“with no time out” and that no pre-assigned ending can be attributed to them before they
have been accomplished). 
60 These three features should be seen as analytical guidelines the accuracy of which has to
be substantiated by data collected in fieldwork. Sociologists who profess their proximity
to Pragmatism should keep in mind that its spirit conveys the idea that uncertainty is
seldom  completely  wiped  out  and  that  indeterminacy,  contextuality  and  emergence
constantly call  for normalization8 and revision (Livet 2001).  Hence studying the ways
doubt (in the pragmatist sense of the word) is dealt with in everyday practices looks like
being a sound contribution to the development of a sociological theory of knowledge.
This  should  ultimately  be  the  best  part  of  the  respecified  legacy  of  pragmatism  to
sociology.
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NOTES
1. We should remember that  the pragmatist  conception of  satisfaction is  not  utilitarian,  but
directly linked to what is required for the appropriate accomplishment of an action in a given
circumstance.
2. To quote the title of Becker’s book (Becker 1986).
3. The first occurrence of this notion is found in one of Goffman’s early articles: “I have argued in
this paper that any social encounter,  any focused gathering, is to be understood, in the first
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instance, in terms of the functioning of the ‘membrane’ that encloses it, cutting it from a field of
properties that could be given weight” (Goffman 1961: 79-81).
4. According to Weber,  methodological  pluralism is perfectly appropriated to social  sciences,
since social phenomena are not reducible to one causal factor only and have to be tackled from as
many perspectives as necessary.
5. Mead conceives of the social act in terms of Dewey’s analysis of the reflex arc (Dewey 1896).
6. “Reflexivity of action” must be differentiated from “reflexivity of actors” (Czysewski 1994).
7. For a more elaborate version of this argument, see Ogien 2009.
8. According  to  Garfinkel  (1963:  188)  normalization  practices  are  resorted  to  each  time
individuals  feel  that  discrepancies  between  expected  and  actual  events  occur  and  are
unreflectingly and directly restored to allow for the continuity of an ongoing action.
ABSTRACTS
This article provides an account of a body of sociological studies recently published which claim
to adopt a pragmatist approach. It discusses the validity of this claim through highlighting the
similarity between some principles of pragmatism and of sociology (the primacy of practice, the
decisive nature of context, the importance of uncertainty, the temporality of action, the sociality
of  normativity).  It  eventually  argues that  a  sociological  pragmatist-oriented approach should
endorse a radically fallibilist perspective and take into account the openness and contingency of
inquiry as topics to be empirically investigated as essential aspects of action in common. This
would entail paying particular attention to the ingenious ways in which three features of action
in common are overcome in practical activities: indeterminacy (descriptions are never complete
and individuals have constantly to make sense by themselves of the unavoidable shortcomings of
communication);  contextuality  (renouncing  any  kind  of  essentialism  and  adhering
to Wittgenstein’s  ordinary  grammar perspective);  and  emergence  (apprehending  action  in
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